Abstract
Introduction
Renewable energies are about to dramatically change the power sector. Impressive technology learning curves and governmental support programs enhance the increasing penetration of renewable energies.
Particularly solar photovoltaics (PV) is developing remarkably (IEA, 2014; IRENA, 2015) . PV is highly suitable for decentral generation in small units close to demand and is about to reach grid parity in many countries (IEA, 2014; Karneyeva & Wüstenhagen, 2016; Schleicher-Tappeser, 2012 ). Grid parity describes the point where decentrally generated solar power reaches the same level as the retail power price. Consequently, installing solar power with self-consumption becomes an attractive investment option for house owners. And so become consumers so-called prosumers -consumers who consume and produce power (Kesting & Bliek, 2013) .
Current power systems are designed for centralized generation to supply fully dependent consumers.
Costs of the distribution grid infrastructure are most frequently recovered from consumers based on a volumetric grid tariff, which charges the consumers per kWh of used power. A volumetric tariff it is a straightforward design to recover the costs of the grid infrastructure, particularly with an increasing demand basis (Costello & Hemphill, 2014; Felder & Athawale, 2014) . However, nowadays net demand became less predictable and shows a tendency to decrease through the diffusion of self-consumption concepts and increased investments into energy efficiency (Ruester et al., 2014) .
Under a volumetric tariff, solar prosumers can reduce their power bill by avoiding the full retail price for the amount of self-consumed power. The PV bill savings of solar prosumers appear as missing return on the utility company's income statement. To compensate for the missing return, the utility company increases the grid tariff. In return, higher retail power prices increase the attractiveness of self-consumption concepts. This sets off a self-reinforcing feedback loop. Most researchers expect the cost recovery feedback loop -sometimes also called the "death spiral" -to cause the retail power price to rise (Costello & Hemphill, 2014; Darghouth et al., 2016b; Felder & Athawale, 2014) .
On the one hand, grid operators perceive this situation as explicitly negative, as recovering the costs of distribution grid becomes increasingly difficult. Increasing the grid tariff usually comes with large administrative hurdles, since grid operators are strongly regulated monopolies. On the other hand, the opportunity of bill savings for solar prosumers fosters the diffusion of PV, hence contributing to national energy and climate policy goals. A distribution effect between conventional consumers and solar prosumers is a potential consequence of adjusting the grid tariff (Eid et al., 2014; Ruester et al., 2014) .
As the grid assets are highly determined by fixed costs, the current volumetric tariff does not reflect the full costs of supplying prosumers. The issue of cost recovery of distribution grids with solar prosumers is subject to a controversial political debate1. A capacity tariff is frequently discussed as a potential solution (Costello & Hemphill, 2014; Eid et al., 2014) .
In this study, I simulate and quantify two important interdependent aspects: (a) the long-term dynamics between the diffusion of solar prosumer, with and without storage, and the ability of grid operators to recover the costs of distribution grids; (b) the resulting distribution effect and deviations from the cost causation principle for the distinct consumer groups over time. The paper presents a comparative analysis of a volumetric tariff -comparing a net purchase and sale policy with net metering, a capacity tariff and a flat tariff, contributing to the current academic as well as political debate. The analysis is conducted for the situation of a Swiss utility company under the unbundling regulation, separating the grid operation from power generation.
Background2

PV bill savings under different utility regulations and grid tariff designs
Various utility regulations exist around the globe, affecting the attractiveness of self-consumption. The scope of PV bill savings of solar prosumers particularly depends on the applied grid tariff design and types of net metering (Darghouth et al., 2011 (Darghouth et al., , 2014 Darghouth et al., 2016a; Eid et al., 2014) . These studies typically focus on analyzing different billing periods of the net metering system. Yamamoto 1 For instance in Switzerland addressing the grid tariff design is an important topic in the coming revision of the Swiss electricity law (Swiss Federal Office of Energy, 2015) . 2 A tabular overview on the quantitative studies on cost recovery of distribution grids is provided in Table 4 in Appendix A in the supporting material.
(2012) describes three types of net metering, two of which are of relevance for self-consumption concepts: net metering and net purchase and sale. An overview of grid tariffs and net metering design options is given in Table 1 . Only few studies analyze the effect of solar prosumers with storage in a quantitative manner in the context of grid operators allocating the distribution grid costs (Eid et al., 2014; Grace, 2014) . However, self-consumption concepts that are combined with storage can reach much higher self-sufficiency degrees, but also have the potential to be used in a grid-optimized manner (Santos et al., 2014; Veldman et al., 2013) .
Tariff design
Design options PV bill savings Application cases
Volumetric tariff
No self-consumption describes a situation where selfconsumption is prohibited by regulatory laws. The situation can also emerge from high feed-in tariffs for renewable energies (subsidies) which are higher than the retail power price or generation costs larger than the retail power price.
Switzerland before 2014
Net metering allows prosumers to cover demand with the self-generated power for the billing period. The billing period, also called the rolling credit timeframe, can be an hour, a day, a month or even a year (Eid et al., 2014; Ruester et al., 2014) . Net metering systems with longer billing period allow for the accounting of larger bill savings, although no direct self-consumption is conducted (Darghouth et al., 2011 (Darghouth et al., , 2014 Darghouth et al., 2016ab; Eid et al., 2014) .
Daily net metering
Denmark
Monthly net metering
Alaska, Georgia, Oklahoma
Yearly net metering
California, The Netherlands
The net purchase and sale mechanism only considers time simultaneous self-consumption. A private PV owner can reach a self-sufficiency degree of about 30 percent with direct self-consumption (Weniger et al., 2014) . Consequently, the prosumer saves 30% on her power bill and creates an additional income by selling the surplus power. Surplus generation is sold to the utility for a defined feedin tariff and can improve the profitability of the PV investment, but is accounted separately.
Switzerland, Italy
Capacity tariff A capacity tariff charges consumers based on the maximum peak demand in a specific timeframe. The timeframe for the billing period of a capacity tariff can vary. The PV bill-savings depend on whether the self-consumption system can reduce the maximum peak demand.
Pilot projects in the Netherlands 
EURELECTRIC, 2013).
Several qualitative studies identify the cost recovery of utility infrastructure under a decentralizing power system as a problematic situation that demands for an adjustment in the regulation (Costello & Hemphill, 2014; Felder & Athawale, 2014; Ruester et al., 2014; Schleicher-Tappeser, 2012) . The selfreinforcing aspect and developments over time of the cost recovery are only rarely analyzed in a quantitative manner. Two notable exceptions are Cai et al. (2013) and Darghouth et al. (2016b) . Cai et al. (2013) find that the strength of the cost recovery feedback loop strongly depends on the share of house owners with a higher tolerance for uncertainty. Potential for further research is located in the more realistic representation of the investment decision for PV (Cai et al., 2013) . Darghouth et al. (2016b) find that there is a compensating effect through lowering wholesale power prices caused by larger feed-ins of solar power. This so-called "duck curve" (Darghouth et al., 2015; Grace, 2014) can nearly off-set the increase of the tariff for the end-consumers. In this respect, it is decisive whether utility companies really pass on the wholesale price advantage to end-consumers, which depends on the applied utility regulation. In a regime with an integrated service regulation for utilities, as applied in the United States and the study by Darghouth et al. (2016b) , reduced wholesale power prices can trigger the described compensating effect. In a regime with unbundling of power generation from the grid operation, as applied in Europe (Eid et al., 2014) , the two effects play out in separate business units and therefore can only be considered as indirectly compensating. Ruester et al. (2014) , furthermore, mention enormous variation of levels of unbundling in Europe. Most of the literature on the cost recovery of distribution grids assumes an integrated utility service system. Eid et al. (2014) stands out by highlighting the distinction between the two regulation systems while addressing the unbundling system. Alternative tariff and market designs are only considered in the analysis in Darghouth et al. (2016a) and Eid et al. (2014) . In this study, I focus on the situation of a utility company under the unbundling regulation. To address the differences, I simulate the net metering system in a scenario as a comparison. Variants in tariff design are tested.
Distributive justice of power grid costs
Regulatory authorities aim for distributive justice among the power consumers, when defining regulations for cost recovery of power distribution grids. However, what is perceived as fair, is subject to personal views and preferences, as nicely explained by Tabi and Wüstenhagen (2017) . When it comes to recovering costs from distribution grids, there seems to be a consensus that an equity principle should be applied. The cost causation principle is one of the most frequently named equity principles for ideal tariff design for power distribution grids1, intending that consumers pay for the costs they cause. Furthermore, the efficiency principle is considered to incentivize efficient use of power, as well as efficient operation and investments for powers grids (Green, 1997) .
The only approach to measure the occurring distribution effect caused by self-consumption was seen in Eid et al. (2014) . She measures the distribution effect2 as the share of lost income of utilities, considering different net metering designs. An analysis of how the distribution effect develops over time is missing, as well as a quantitative analysis of the cost causation principle for solar prosumers and conventional consumers. No comprehensive study was found that covers the full dynamics of the cost recovery feedback loop, considering the emerging solar prosumer concepts including storage and prosumer communities, and evaluating the distribution effect and deviations from the cost causation principle for distinct consumer groups.
Method and model
To simulate the interplay between the diffusion of self-consumption concepts and the grid tariff level I chose a System Dynamics simulation approach (Forrester, 1961; Sterman, 2000) . System Dynamics is particularly suitable to endogenously simulate feedback processes and dynamics over time. The simulation model is designed, calibrated and simulated for the particular circumstances of a Swiss utility company. Switzerland applies an unbundling regulation for utilities, separating the grid operation from 1 See for example Swiss Electricity Law (Schweizer Stromversorgungsgesetz), Art. 14, paragraph 3. of PV investment costs. The conceptual model framework of Kubli and Ulli-Beer (2016) was used as a basis, but was refined to a more realistic representation of the system. I present the extended model along its dynamic structure, data and the validation with four additional. A full model documentation, including all equations, can be found in the supporting material.
Causal structure of the simulation model
The model captures, besides the conventional consumption concepts of grid consumers, four self-consumption concepts: solar prosumers, solar prosumers with storage, solar prosumer communities and solar prosumer communities with storage. Consumers are categorized in three consumers groups -single-family houses, multi-family houses and commercial customers -due to essential differences in the investment decision and significantly different self-sufficiency levels (Weniger et al., 2014) . The consumer groups are to be understood as a consumer unit sharing the same grid connection (the inhabitants of one house). The respective owners are in charge of taking the investment decisions. I assume that prosumer communities are only realized within a multi-family house, as it is currently legally allowed in Switzerland. Consumers can adopt to self-consumption concepts through different decision pathways (see box (a) in Figure 1 ). A grid consumer can decide to invest in a prosumer concept or a storage prosumer concept, or just remain a conventional grid consumer. Prosumers can enhance their system by installing a storage technology, such as a battery, to become a prosumer with storage. The characteristics of the self-consumption concepts for the three consumer groups are presented in Table 2 .
Installed capacity
Share consumption from grid1
Net The endogenous simulation of the cost recovery feedback loop of distribution grids with the interplay between the diffusion of solar prosumers and the cost recovery allows to analyze the dynamics of the 1 Share consumption from grid and the share excess energy is based on (Weniger et al., 2014) -exact values for one family houses, for multi-family houses and commercial customers the source was used as a guidance. The term "share consumption from grid" is the residual of the self-sufficiency degree (which is sometimes used within this text).
2 Based in the information from BKW Energie AG for their supply area. The consumption of a commercial customer is an assumption.
3 Values for peak demand are well-informed assumptions. I assume that the peak demand for a one family house and multifamily house remains the same with the PV plant. For commercial customers it is assumed that the peak demand can be reduced as generation times coincidence with PV generation. According to Santos et al. (2014, p. 259) a battery used for self-consumption optimization can help to reduce the peak demand to 70% of the original peak demand.
4 Based on Veldman et al. (2013) , the peak of normal residential electricity use can be reduced by 8% applying load control.
For prosumer, I assume the peak demand can be reduce through demand shifting by additional 10% compared to a grid consumer. Based on Santos et al. (2014, p. 259 ) a battery applied with a focus on peak demand reduction can help to reduce the peak demand to 50% of the initial demand. Figure 1 -the cost recovery feedback loop, the peer effect, the probability of investorroof match and the scarcity effect. The cost recovery feedback loop is triggered by the constellation of the consumers and the applied selfconsumption concepts, as these determine net demand. Net demand and total grid costs, as well as the tariff design define the indicated grid tariff. The attractiveness of self-consumption concepts is determined by several factors. Karneyeva and Wüstenhagen (2016) define the economics of decentrally installed PV plants by the savings and the income, resulting from the self-sufficiency level and sales of excess energy. Savings come from avoiding the grid tariff but also from power costs. The tariff design and level impact the attractiveness of self-consumption concepts by defining how much can be saved by self-consuming. Income comes from the remuneration for surplus generation and potential subsidies influence the profitability of self-consumption concepts. Most relevant costs factors are the investment costs and operating costs and, in the case of prosumer communities, also measuring and administrative costs are considered. Empirical research finds that the payback period is the most frequently chosen concept for investment decisions by private investors; other concepts such as the net present value (NPV) or the internal rate of return (IRR) are less frequently applied (Ebers & Wüstenhagen, 2015, p.16 ).
In reality, investment decisions are not made on purely economic considerations. Particularly for private house owners investing in renewable energy technology, other factors are frequently more relevant (Helms et al., 2015) . Insights from behavioral decision theory and empirical studies in the energy field are used to achieve a realistic representation of the decision-making process. People make their decisions based on the perceived level of attributes relevant for their decision (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) , in this case the perception of the payback period. In the model, I distinguish between two investor typesthe investors deciding based on economic criteria -the "economic investors" -and the investors that also consider non-financial benefits besides the payback period -the "green investors". Empirical research in the energy field supports this segmentation and the relevance of non-financial factors, such as perceived self-sufficiency (Ebers & Wüstenhagen, 2015; Korcaj et al., 2015; Salm et al., 2016) . The decision process for the investment in a self-consumption concept is structured as a sequential decision process (Johnson, 1984) , separating the decision whether a switch of concept is generally worthwhile from the selection of the concrete concept.
Learning from peers has a significant impact on the perceived attractiveness of self-consumption concepts (Bollinger & Gillingham, 2012) , which is captured in the peer effect feedback loop. This feedback loop describes the positive influence from neighbors with a PV plant on the considerations of the investor.
Not every house is suitable for PV installation. Interested investors may not always be those with the most suitable rooftops, limiting the probability of the match between the investor and the roof. This is captured with the probability of investor-roof match feedback loop, which is assumed to slow down the diffusion process.
The scarcity effect feedback loop takes into account the geo-physical limits of the diffusion to the technical potential for PV deployment. For the theoretical foundations and the detailed reasoning of the feedback structure based on network theory, I refer to .
Model structure and equations
For the model structure and equations, I refer to the delivered supporting material, which contains a comprehensive description of all model equations and data inputs.
Data, calibration and validation with five cases
The model is applied for the case of the supply area of the utility company BKW in the Canton of Berne, Switzerland. The utility company BKW provided data for the grid costs and the grid structure. The developments of the technology costs for PV and battery are based on the predictions of IRENA (2015), estimations for the increase in grid costs on Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2013). Details on the data input are provided in Appendix C of the supporting material.
For validation the suggested procedure by Barlas (1996) The term represents the percent increase of the grid tariff caused by solar prosumers, independent of increasing costs of grid infrastructure:
Deviation from the cost causation principle: The deviation from cost causation principle measures the contribution of a consumer to the cost of the distribution grid relative to the costs caused by the respective consumer. In concrete terms, the deviation from cost causation is defined as follows:
where is:
The contribution to the cost recovery of the distribution grid is defined as the costs paid for grid usage over a year by the consumer, equaling the grid usage bill ( ). I here define the caused costs as the costs for the effective connection size necessary, determined by the peak demand ( , ) plus a reserve assumed of 30%. I initialize the term to zero to focus on the distribution effect arising from decentralization1. The measure shows the deviation from perfect cost causation (which would be a value of zero) for a customer with the respective consumption concept in percent (%).
Results
For the analysis, I simulate five scenarios, described in Table 4 First, I compare the scenario "volumetric tariff", where a net purchase and sale policy is applied, with the "net metering" scenario to analyze the difference between the current regulatory setting in Switzerland versus a setting, as it can be found in the US. I assume a yearly billing period to simulate the most extreme case possible, leading to 100% PV bill savings on grid costs (see Table 1 ) and excess power is compensated with the power price ( ). Second, I present simulation experiments with alternative grid tariff designs -a flat tariff, a capacity tariff and a capacity tariff with the option for consumers to implement peak demand optimization. 
Scenarios
Diffusion of self-consumption concepts
Volumetric tariff scenario
The scenario volumetric tariff, presented in Figure 5 , involves the most likely diffusion behavior under the current Swiss regulation. Single-family houses adopt the prosumer as well as the storage prosumer concept, with a majority remaining with the prosumer concept. Multi-family houses first have a similar adoption for both concepts, while over time the storage prosumer concept becomes dominant. A shift in the dominating concept can be observe among the commercial customers. At first, a strong adoption of the prosumer concept occurs. After 2020, the storage prosumer concept becomes more attractive for commercial customers, due to decreasing battery prices and the increasing grid tariff. The number of prosumers drops, as commercial customers are updating their systems with batteries. The retrofitting process also occurs at the other consumer groups, but is not as pronounced. Overall, there is a strong diffusion of self-consumption concepts. Considering the storage prosumer concept appears to be very relevant, as larger shares of consumers invest in concepts that combine PV and storage.
Important factors for the diffusion of the self-consumption concepts are the investment decision function, considering different benefits from the self-consumption concepts, and the general increase in the overall grid costs. The effect of non-financial factors in the investment decision is particularly evident in the case of single-family houses. "Green investors" serve as early adopters, decisively contributing to market development. If all single-family houses would invest based on only economic criteria, diffusion would lag behind the reference until 2025 and could catch up to the level of the scenario "volumetric tariff" until the end of simulation (for a demonstration of the effect of the investment decision criteria see Appendix F in the supporting material). The overall increase in grid costs is the major driver for the increase in the volumetric grid tariff, and not the distribution effect, as often discussed in previous research and political debates. Particularly, the storage prosumer concept finds less adopters among singlefamily houses and commercial customers with constant grid costs. For multi-family houses, the storage prosumer concept is already attractive without a strong increase in the grid tariff (for demonstration see Appendix F in the supporting material).
Net metering policy with yearly billing scenario
Relating to the academic discussions, I compare the volumetric tariff with net purchase and sale policy to a scenario with a net metering policy with yearly billing ( Figure 5 ). The net metering policy has considerable effects on the adoption of the self-consumption concepts. The net metering policy is generally slightly more attractive for self-consumption concepts, as compared to the net purchase and sale policy combined with an investment grant of 30%. The attractiveness of both concepts increases under the net metering policy. Nevertheless, through net metering stored power has the same value as the excess power. Consequently, there are no additional incentives to invest in a storage prosumer concept1.
1 There is an adoption of the storage prosumer concept, although under the net-metering policy no financial incentive exists for storage installation, due to the functioning of the logit function implemented and the effect of investors also considering nonfinancial aspect. The total capacity expansion of PV over time look similar across the scenarios, ranging between 333 to 339 MW as an installed capacity in 2050. This equals 62% to 63% of the technical potential. While the capacity expansion is only slightly stronger, the net metering policy leads to a considerably higher distribution effect, as we just saw. Therefore, comparing the unbundling system, with a net purchase and sales policy, with the integrated system with net metering is not reasonable. Targeted research is necessary. 
Deviations from the cost causation principle
The deviations from the cost causation principle is evaluated for the year 2050 in Figure 7 for the scenario volumetric tariff. Prosumers and storage prosumers benefit from avoiding grid tariff costs through self-consumption. The deviation from the cost causation principle varies among the different consumer groups and consumption concepts, as there are differences for the peak demand and the self-sufficiency degree. Storage prosumers have, in the case of single-family houses and multi-family houses, a stronger deviation form the cost causation principle. As the avoided costs through large self-sufficiency are higher than the reduced caused costs, the deviation from cost causation is even larger. Commercial customers show better values in the deviation from the cost causation principle, as they can more effectively 
Simulation of alternative tariff designs
Current discussions consider alternative grid tariff designs as an option to reduce the deviation from the cost causation principle of self-consumption concepts. I test two options: (a) a flat tariff, charging all consumers connected to the grid with the same monthly tariff; (b) a capacity tariff, charging the consumers based on the peak consumption of power per year. The capacity tariff can set incentives for consumer to take measures to reduce their peak demand. In the scenario "capacity tariff with grid friendly behavior", storage prosumers can shift to a peak demand reducing behavior, based on the definition in equation (24) in the supporting material. The resulting diffusion patterns of prosumers and storage prosumers are presented in Figure 8 . Deviation from the cost causation principle
The flat tariff
The flat tariff generally sets fewer incentives for self-consumption concepts. With the flat tariff, only the avoided power price can be accounted as savings. The sales of excess power remain, as well as the non-financial benefits. Therefore, the adoption of the storage prosumer concept is considerably lower, or zero in the case of commercial customers. Consumers still adopt the prosumer concept, as the concept still becomes profitable and gains from the comparably low attractiveness of the storage prosumer concept. Overall, a much lower installed capacity of PV results under the flat tariff (Figure 9b ). 
The capacity tariff
The main incentive of the capacity tariff is targeted towards a reduction of the peak demand. For this reason, the storage prosumer gains on relative attractiveness. However, the adoption of the storage prosumer concept is lower than in the base run for the cases of single-family houses and multi-family houses. As the peak demand is not reduced relatively less than the saved share with self-consumption, a lower adoption and less installed capacity of PV results (Figure 9b ).
In the scenario "capacity tariff with option for peak reduction", peak reduction is profitable already for the beginning for single-family houses and multi-family houses, for prosumers as well as storage prosumers. Only for commercial customers with the storage prosumer concept, it is not profitable to adopt the grid-optimized behavior at first. Since demand shifting is profitable for commercial consumers with the prosumer concept from the beginning of the simulation, commercial customers strongly adopt the prosumer concept at first and then, later on, shift to the storage prosumer concept. It is important to note that the scenario does not include technical costs for demand shifting to reduce peak demand, such as devices for smart control, which might alter the cost evaluation.
The scenarios with alternative grid tariff designs clearly highlight that adjustments in the grid tariff lead to significant changes in the attractiveness of the self-consumption concepts and therefore influence the speed and form of diffusion. The tested flat tariff and capacity tariff (with and without demand shifting) cause lower investments in PV capacity (Figure 9b ), having a negative effect on reaching renewable energy policy targets.
Deviation from the cost causation principle under alternative grid tariff designs
Looking at the distribution effect resulting from the alternative grid tariff designs tested in Figure 9 , we note that the alternative tariffs cause a weaker distribution effect than the volumetric grid tariff. Under the flat tariff, no increase in the tariff occurs, as all consumer remain connected to the grid. However, Figure 10 demonstrates that there are still consumers disadvantaged under the flat tariff. Storage prosumers, who reduce their peak demand, now pay more for the grid than the costs they actually cause.
The capacity tariff, on the other hand, does not lead to a deviation from the cost causation principle (Figure 10 ), as the caused costs were defined based on the effectively needed connection size. However, under the capacity tariff the distribution effect still raises (Figure 9a ). Due to the existing grid infrastructure, reductions in peak demand are not automatically translated to a smaller connection size. Therefore, the overall grid costs are still recovered from the customer base. Consequently, conventional grid consumers still pay more due to the diffusion of self-consumption concepts. When storage prosumers adopt a grid friendly behavior by reducing their peak demand, the distribution effect is even larger and close to the distribution effect under the base run (Figure 9a ). 
Conclusion
Self-consumption of locally generated power increasingly challenges the ability of utility companies to recover costs of their distribution grid. As solar prosumers can avoid part of the grid costs under the volumetric grid tariff, costs are distributed differently among customers, leading to a distribution effect and deviations from the cost causation principle. In this study, I investigated the scope of the distribution effect and the deviation from the cost causation principle of grid consumers, solar prosumers and solar prosumers with storage. Furthermore, I tested currently discussed alternative grid tariff designs in a System Dynamics simulation model.
The simulation results indicate a strong diffusion of solar prosumers in all simulated scenarios. Storage appears to play a crucial role in the analysis of the cost recovery of distribution grids. Prosumers with storage diffuse widely among the consumer groups. The scenario "volumetric tariff", a scenario assum- would pay 12.5 CHF per year more due to the distribution effect. Important to keep in mind is that also initially there are deviations from the cost causation principle, due to differences between the net consumed power and the used grid connection size. Net metering provides stronger incentives for consumers to adopt the prosumer concept, but is less attractive for additional storage installation. Under the net metering policy, a much larger distribution effect arises, reaching a level of 24% in 2050. The differences in results between net metering and the unbundling system with a net purchase and sale highlight the need for regulation and policy specific evaluation of the distribution effect caused by self-consumption. This study contributes to the academic as well as political debate on distributive justice of power grid costs by (a) highlighting this difference and (b) shedding a particular focus on the unbundling system with a net purchase and sales policy, which has not been analyzed previously in literature.
Alternative grid tariff designs are discussed as potential solutions to resolve the distribution effect and the deviation from cost causation. I tested a flat tariff and a capacity tariff, with and without option for peak reduction through load shifting, for their impact on the diffusion of self-consumption concepts, the distribution effect and deviation from the cost causation principle of the self-consumption concepts. The flat tariff prevents a self-consumption induced increase of the grid tariff, but lowers the attractiveness of self-consumption and hinders diffusion. The PV capacity expansion under the capacity tariff is smaller than under volumetric tariff, but sets incentives for consumers to invest and adopt a behavior that reduces peak demand, leading to a relatively stronger adoption of the storage prosumer concept.
The capacity grid tariff successfully reduces the deviations from the cost causation principle, as consumers pay for the effectively needed connection size. Nevertheless, the capacity tariff still increases due to self-consumption diffusion, as the grid infrastructure already exists and has to be amortized.
Therefore, the distribution effect, which considers historic costs, still increases, indicating that conventional grid consumers pay more than they would if there was no diffusion of self-consumption. Considering that consumers can invest in a peak demand optimized behavior, by shifting demand and adjusting the storage management, the distribution effect increases to a level even higher, only slightly lower than under the volumetric grid tariff.
Recommendations for energy policy
Overall, the findings of this study confirm that a distribution effect occurs under the volumetric grid tariff with unbundling, but it is moderate in scope. Therefore, under the unbundling regulation, distributive justice should not overly dominate debates. In contrast, the results highlight the importance of the tariff design induced investment incentives for self-consumption. Changes in the attractiveness of the self-consumption concepts have a strong effect on the diffusion of solar prosumers. Governments should not only focusing on keeping the distribution effect in a tolerable range, but put an emphasis on whether the grid tariff design incentivizes an efficient and sustainable development of the power system. A capacity-based tariff sets incentives in the right direction of reducing peak demand, but also causes a distribution effect. Furthermore, implementing the capacity tariff requires additional investments for measuring, which induce extra costs on the system and have to be amortized too. When considering a shift in the tariff design, the costs and benefits should be weighted carefully.
It is worth noting, that the overall benefit of solar power arises on a societal level by avoiding negative external costs of fossil fuels (Krewitt, 2002) . Generally, contributions to a renewable energy provision should be compensated in an appropriate manner on the power side and contributions to an efficient use of grid infrastructure should be rewarded on the grid side. Part of an efficient use of the grid is using the locally generated power on site, or in the same grid level. Current tariff designs and policies only consider the building level for self-consumption, but do not give incentives for optimized use of resources within a distribution grid. In a future energy system, with larger penetration of decentralized energy generation, grid costs should consider which grid infrastructure was needed to transfer the power to the consumer by considering the origin of the power. Enabling this would require a change of the current structure of the cost allocation of power grids, to a system that considers grid levels separately. Obviously, transitioning to this system requires major changes and takes time. However, a grid level specific tariff would set the right incentives to ensure optimal use of local resources in a system conducive manner. Decentral generation and storage plants could, for instance, be used for flexibility provision at the distribution grid level instead of self-consumption optimization on a building scale.
Furthermore, as built grid connections remain for decades, it is important to support including decentral energy generation with low peak demand right when new buildings are constructed. In this manner, the expansion of the grid infrastructure can be reduced, resulting in cost savings.
Limitations and further research
Estimating the caused costs of a consumer is a particularly delicate task. I here assumed the effectively used connection size as the determinant. Defining the caused costs by the effectively needed capacity implies that a change of a grid consumer to a storage prosumer concept, which effectively reduces peak demand, would also reduce the caused costs. In practice, this would require reducing the connection size, which would cause extra costs. Furthermore, in reality, the caused costs depend on the impacts on the entire grid infrastructure. For a perfect measurement, a technical simulation of every individual consumer based on the caused marginal costs in the particular grid setting would be required. Furthermore, one could argue that the historically caused costs should be considered in the measure of cost causation as well.
The simulation model defines the self-consumption concepts by a fixed technology constellation in installed capacity and type. However, realistically these constellations are adjusted with changes in technology prices and incentives. Additionally, in future, district solutions -such as microgrids or district prosumer communities or district batteries -will play a crucial role. Further research should target both aspects, by building an endogenous model structure enabling the dynamic adjustment of the self-consumption concepts and include district solutions.
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